A person servicing a machine could be injured by powered motion through an open maintenance-access guard. This is an illustrative document review, with no machine operation or incident recorded. The first task is to connect that possible mishap to the software function that could permit motion.

The proposed rule refuses a motion request while the guard is open and issues no command enabling that requested motion. Ordinary permitted operation must remain possible when the guard is closed and all other approved prerequisites hold. The rule is a proposal; its program basis and approval are not established.

The initial proposed plan covers only ordinary closed-guard operation. It contains no open-guard challenge and no recorded execution, so it cannot demonstrate the protective rule. Reading the plan identifies this gap. It tells us nothing about how an implementation or a physical machine actually behaved.

The proposed correction adds an open-guard refusal check and retains the permitted-operation case. After the requirement and verification setup are approved, compare the expected request outcome and enabling command for each. This pairing would challenge both an omitted guard check and a controller that refuses everything. Neither case has been executed.

For the maintenance-guard proposal, the verification plan needs decisions about stale guard information, guard movement during a request, and the relevant actuator interfaces. Required timing, stopping and restart behavior are not established here. Calling the control an interlock does not demonstrate independent intervention or protection of the person servicing the machine.

Copy the free starter for one real control requirement. Ask its requirement owner and system-safety lead to settle the rule, and its verification lead to plan the next check. Actual people remain unassigned here. The document review identifies a gap and proposes the next decision. Verification is not executed; mitigation effectiveness and risk acceptance are not established.