The check is default-on, error, verify stage. It is the single companion for four faces of the same honesty contract: a //mcdc:ignore:known-issue exemption on a TRUE row, a // MCDC … [known-issue] [ki:] reachability witness on a FALSE row, and a KI-linked obligation_deferrals entry used by both decomposition and evidence. The disposition is valid exactly while the linked KnownIssue is open and its reproducer still reproduces. When the tripwire flips green to red, the leftover is a lie.
Measuring MC/DC is a different hop. That page is whether each condition flips the outcome on its own. Completeness of a KnownIssue record is a different hop. Neither one asks whether an exemption still sitting on SYS-REQ-42 outlived KI-cache-miss after the bug was fixed.
//mcdc:ignore:known-issue SYS-REQ-42: cache miss still reproduces => TRUE [ki: KI-cache-miss]
// the KI yaml:
id: KI-cache-miss
status: fixed
Three remediations, one finding kind each. Stale TRUE exemption: delete the :known-issue line and write a real // MCDC SYS-REQ-42 witness. Stale FALSE reachability witness: drop the [known-issue] [ki:] tags and revert to a plain structural ignore. Stale obligation deferral: replace it with a satisfying child or a triple-form witness, then remove the ki_ref. Re-opening the KnownIssue without re-running the reproducer is the anti-pattern this hop exists to make impossible.
proof mcdc show SYS-REQ-42
proof known-issue list --status fixed
proof audit --check mcdc_known_issue_disposition_stale
A fourth case is a premature close: the tripwire went red because the KI was marked fixed early, or the reproducer rotted. Restore the KnownIssue only after you re-run the reproducer and the defect still reproduces. Opt-out reports skip, never pass. A human waiver is an authorization gate, not a mute.